Using container inspection history to improve interdiction logistics for illicit nuclear materials

Strengthening the United States' ability to prevent adversaries from smuggling nuclear materials into the country is a vital and ongoing issue. The prospect of additional countries, such as Iran, obtaining the know‐how and equipment to produce these special nuclear materials in the near future underscores the need for efficient and effective inspection policies at ports and border crossings. In addition, the reduction of defense and homeland security budgets in recent years has made it increasingly important to accomplish the interdiction mission with fewer funds. Addressing these complications, in this article, we present a novel two‐port interdiction model. We propose using prior inspection data as a low‐cost way of increasing overall interdiction performance. We provide insights into two primary questions: first, how should a decision maker at a domestic port use detection data from the foreign port to improve the overall detection capability? Second, what are potential limitations to the usefulness of prior inspection data—is it possible that using prior data actually harms decision making at the domestic port? We find that a boundary curve policy (BCP) that takes into account both foreign and domestic inspection data can provide a significant improvement in detection probability. This BCP also proves to be surprisingly robust, even if adversaries are able to infiltrate shipments during transit. © 2013 Wiley Periodicals, Inc. Naval Research Logistics 60: 433‐448, 2013     

Reflections on Transparency and Monitoring under the 1993 United States-Russian Federation Highly Enriched Uranium Purchase Agreement

ABSTRACT

The 1993 Highly Enriched Uranium (HEU) Purchase Agreement between the United States and Russian Federation is often described as one of the world's most successful nuclear nonproliferation programs. In 2013, the two states achieved the agreement's major goals of downblending 500 metric tons of Russian weapon-origin HEU to low enriched uranium (LEU) and delivering all resultant LEU to the United States. At one time, the LEU delivered under the agreement generated nearly 10 percent of all electricity in the United States. The agreement achieved its nonproliferation goals through a unique government/industry partnership. Commercial executive agents contracted for the annual sale and delivery of downblended LEU, while the US and Russian governments exercised reciprocal transparency monitoring measures to demonstrate that all LEU delivered under the agreement was derived from Russian weapons-origin HEU, and that the same LEU was used for exclusively peaceful purposes in the United States. The commercial development, negotiations, and implementation of the agreement have been well documented. This article describes the scope of US transparency monitoring activities in Russian HEU processing facilities, as well as Russian monitoring in the United States. In addition, it discusses the results of twenty years of reciprocal transparency monitoring and data analysis, and outlines lessons learned that are potentially applicable to future transparency monitoring and verification regimes and similar cooperative efforts.     

The Trust Paradox in Nuclear Smuggling

ABSTRACT

This article explores the paradox of trust in the largest nuclear smuggling operation involving highly enriched uranium (HEU) discussed in open source literature. In the first effort to understand the type, extent, and role of trust in nuclear smuggling enterprises, it draws from literature on trust development in legitimate businesses as well as criminal enterprises. Observed behavioral patterns in this case challenge traditional notions of the internal dynamics of temporary groups engaged in nuclear smuggling and operational realities of such activities. The article seeks to explain why individuals agree (and continue) to operate in this high-risk environment, unbound by close personal ties, without any effort to verify the background, motives, or qualifications of the fellow conspirators. It offers ways to advance current nonproliferation efforts in non-state actor interdiction by exploiting the environment of shallow trust in temporary groups.     

基于维修器材离散随机需求最佳库存量确定研究

结合装备维修器材保障工作,就维修器材离散随机需求最佳库存量确定进行研究,对其建模进行系统分析,结合修理厂维修器材最佳库存量进行实例计算,以指导维修器材最佳库存量的确定.     

未来能量互联的关键设备——固态变压器

固态变压器作为能源互联网中实现能量转换和控制的关键设备,有很多方面需要进行深入研究,文章结合固态变压器的自身特点,对其主要发展的核心技术,包括基于SiC新型宽禁带材料的研制、基于SiC的固态功率器件和固态变压器设计与实现、固态变压器的先进控制策略研究等进行了详细阐述。     

吸波材料的吸波原理及其研究进展

介绍了吸波材料的重要性,阐述了不同情况下吸波材料的吸波原理、种类及其相应特点,综述了铁氧体吸波材料、金属微粉吸波材料、纳米吸波材料及光学透明吸波材料近几年来的国内外研究进展及应用,并对开发高性能吸波材料提出了研发思路。     

建筑内装修防火材料见证取样检验工作存在问题及对策

阐述了建筑内部装修防火材料见证取样检验的意义,分析了目前此项工作的现状和存在问题,提出了下一步的对策。     

热塑性互穿聚合物网络研究综述

概述了热塑性互穿聚合物网络（ＴＩＰＮ）的研究进展及其结构特点、制各方法和熔体的流动性,并对ＴＩＰＮ的前景作了简要的分析。     

阻燃型宽温域阻尼材料的分子设计

本文在大量研究成果的基础上,从材料分子结构的角度提出了阻燃型阻尼材料分子设计的两个关键问题,一是拓宽材料的玻璃化转变范围,二是采取合理的阻燃措施。     

纳米结构炭材料的储放氢性能研究

主要对多种纳米结构炭材料（超级活性炭、多壁碳纳米管,纳米碳纤堆,纳米石墨纤堆、纳米石墨球等）在常温、10-13MPa的氢气压力下的储放氢量进行了测定（其中包括经过一系列物化处理的样品）,井对其结构和比表面积分别采用SEM、TEM、HRTEM、ASAP2010吸附测试仪（BET）进行了分析．实验结果表明：经过处理的纳米碳样品的储放氢量有所提高,但没有一种样品在温和的实验每件下的储放氢量超过1．0wt％,离DOE目标（6．5wt%）相距甚远。